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TRUTH TALES AND TRIAL FILMS
Jessica Silbey*
Investigations into law and popular culture preoccupy themselves with understanding how law and popular cultural forms work
together to challenge or sustain community structures, identity and
power.' It is inevitable at this point in our cultural history that law
and popular culture are intertwined.2 There are too many television
shows, films, popular novels and web-based entertainment to
withdraw "the law" (whatever that is) from the domain of popular
culture. This article takes as a given the intermixing of law and
popular culture, embracing it as a new feature of our popular legal
consciousness. I suggest that one result of this mixing-what I call
truth tales, which are fictionalized films that are nonetheless based
on true stories about law-is to enhance our critical capacity to
engage the law as a hopeful and evolving web of social, civic and
political codes that shape our expectations for justice in
contemporary society.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law. Ph.D. University of
Michigan, 1999; J.D. University of Michigan, 1998; A.B. Stanford University. Thanks to John
Nockleby and the student editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review who organized the
Symposium on Law and Popular Culture. Thanks also to Jennifer Mnookin for her ongoing
Comments welcomed at
discussions with me on all things concerning law and film.
jsilbey@suffolk.edu.
1. See Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the
Situation of Legal Scholarship, in CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL STUDIES, AND THE LAW:
MOVING BEYOND LEGAL REALISM 2-5 (Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon eds., 2003); see also
MICHAEL ASIMOW & SHANNON MADER, LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE: A COURSE BOOK 6-8
(2004) (describing the complex relationship between popular culture and the law); Susan S.
Silbey, Making a Placefor Cultural Analyses of Law, 17 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 39, 41 (1992)
(describing the law and cultural studies movement as one "that emphasizes the role of
consciousness and cultural practice as communicating factors between individual agency and
social structure").
2. See, e.g., RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE
BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE (2000); Jessica M. Silbey, What We Do When We Do
Law and PopularCulture, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 139 (2002) [hereinafter Silbey, Doing Law
and Popular Culture] (reviewing When Law Goes Pop and discussing the interdiscipline of law
and popular culture more generally).
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This article proceeds in five parts. Part I outlines a brief history
of interdisciplinary legal studies, particular law and cultural studies.
Part II discusses the subfield within law and cultural studies of law
and film, as a way to set the stage for a longer discussion in Parts IV
and V of two truth tales, Compulsion3 and Swoon.4 Part III more
specifically describes the parameters of the "truth tale" as a subgenre
of courtroom drama that affects a particular kind of popular legal
consciousness, one that accepts as futile law's presumed search for
unconditional truth and embraces instead the legal system's promise
of due process as based on normative values of fairness. Parts IV
and V are close readings of the two films by way of application of
the interpretive methodology and conceptual framework outlined in
Parts II and III.
1. THE INTERDISCIPLINE OF LAW AND CULTURE

When we engage in the interdiscipline of law and popular
culture, we are doing many things at once. We are investigating how
law and legal practice incorporate elements of popular culture in
law's adjudicative and regulatory functions.' We are exploring ways
in which law is a discursive practice, a form of rhetoric such as
literature and film that constitutes a community of speakers and
listeners.6 We are also disclaiming the autonomy of law and

3. COMPULSION (20th Century Fox 1959).
4. SWOON (American Playhouse 1992).
5. See, e.g., SHERWIN, supra note 2; Neal Feigenson & Meghan A. Dunn, New Visual
Technologies in Court: Directionsfor Research, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 109 (2003); Jessica M.
Silbey, Judges As Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
493 (2004) [hereinafter Silbey, Judges As Film Critics] (analyzing the use of film in courts of law
and proposing film be treated more like substantive and assertive proffers than demonstrative or
illustrative aids).
6. See, e.g., Rebecca Johnson & Ruth Buchanan, The 'Unforgiven' Sources ofInternational
Law: Nation-Building, Violence and Gender in the West(ern), in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN
FEMINIST APPROACHES 131 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds. 2005); JAMES BOYD WHITE,
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984) [hereinafter WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR
MEANING]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND

LEGAL CRITICISM (1990); Rebecca Johnson & Ruth Buchanan, Getting the Insider's Story Out:
What PopularFilm Can Tell Us About Legal Method's Dirty Secrets, 20 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS
JUST. 87 (2001); Jessica M. Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House and the Genre of
Documentary Film, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 107 (2005) [hereinafter Silbey, Filmmaking in the
PrecinctHouse].
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recognizing that it can only be understood as situated within (or as
part of) our contemporary culture.7
The study of law and popular culture has its roots in other
interdisciplinary legal studies, such as law and history, law and
economics, law and philosophy-each of which helped legitimize
the idea of the interdisciplinarity of law itself.8 The study of law and
popular culture has strong roots in the law and literature movement.9
As an infant, the study of law and literature was the study of
representations of law in "great books," the subfield that has become
known as law-in-literature.
Law-in-literature analyzes literary
2 for how these
texts, such as Crime and Punishment" or Billy Budd,"
3
texts describe law.
As a content analysis, law-in-literature is
distinct from law-as-literature, which is a study of discursive
persuasion and the constitution of a community through language. 4
Pioneers of the law-as-literature movement include James Boyd
White, whose seminal book in the field describes law as an art
essentially literary and rhetorical in nature, a way of establishing
meaning and constituting community in language." By "rhetoric,"
White means something supremely political:
the study of the ways in which character and communityand motive, value, reason, social structure, everything, in
short, that makes a culture-are defined and made real in
performances of language.... As the object of art is beauty

7. Generally speaking, this is what the "law and society" movement has been about. See
Susan S. Silbey, Law and Society Movement, in LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A POLITICAL,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 860 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed., 2002). "[L]aw, legal
practices, and legal institutions, can be understood only by seeing and explaining them within
social contexts." Id.; see also Sarat & Simon, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining that cultural studies
often describe a model of law that is more coherent and functional than that revealed by legal
studies).
8. See Silbey, Doing Law and PopularCulture,supra note 2, at 141.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see also William Domnarski, Law and Literature, 27 LEGAL STUD. F. 109, 109-10
(2003) (surveying and categorizing law and literature courses offered at law schools around the
country).
11. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Courage Books 1996) (1886).
12. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUD AND OTHER TALES (New Am. Library 1961) (1924).
13. RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD (Yale Univ. Press 1984) (1944).
14. See Silbey, Doing Law and PopularCulture, supra note 2, at 146.
15.

WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 6, at x-xi.
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and of philosophy truth, the object of rhetoric is justice: the
constitution of a social world. 6
To some extent, the law-in-literature versus law-as-literature
distinction tracks a more general methodological concern in cultural
studies, which is the significance of the direction from which a
scholar approaches her object of study. Cultural studies scholars
tend to divide their analysis into the study of production, reception
and representation. 7 We may investigate the means by which a
cultural object is produced, the ways in which an object is perceived
and operationalized by its audience, and the manner in which it may
be interpreted based on its particular formal structure. 8 Thinking
about the interdisciplinary endeavor of law and culture in these
terms-these three points in the transmission, circulation and
exchange of cultural form-helps to address several weaknesses in
the interdisciplinary field of law and popular culture, especially as it
has grown and aspired to achieve the epistemological goals listed
above.
As White's work emphasizes, studying law as a discursive
practice that constitutes a community is a study of social relations.
Too often, the cultural analysis of law-law-in or -as literature, for
example--omits the analysis of the subject of law, the citizen on
which law acts and who acts on behalf of it. Locating the
construction of that citizen in the text (as an effect of representational
practice) or through the text (as a result of reception theory)
emphasizes the political nature of all cultural production. 9
Remembering that the social subject and her community is at the
center of a cultural study of law goes a long way to answer the cynics
who ask "so what" when legal scholars write about film or literature.
16. Id. at xi.
17. Richard Johnson, What is Cultural Studies Anyway?, SOC. TEXT, Winter 1986-87, at
46-47 (calling these three points "production," "texts/forms" and "readings").
18. Id.
19. Indeed, as Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon note:
Cultural studies has also long been attentive to both the role of subjectivity in
history and to the complex interpenetrations of power and subjectivity ....
Indeed,
much of the corpus of cultural studies consists of tools for tracking the production of
subject positions as well as a growing set of 'case studies' in the subjective history of
power in modem liberal democracies. Beyond methodological innovation, cultural
studies can promote change in legal studies by widening the moments of subjectivity
that are even considered in the analysis of law and legality.
Sarat & Simon, supra note 1, at 8-9.
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Studies of law and popular culture also often fail to demarcate
the terms of their analysis. Both "law" and "culture" are ubiquitous
terms for analysis. As legal scholar Naomi Mezey has written, "[t]he
notion of culture is everywhere invoked and virtually nowhere
explained. '2' As both law and cultural theorists, we could say the
same thing about "law." Law and literature scholars, such as James
Boyd White, typically explore law as a language embodying and
animating text, a distinct set of cultural practices that can be studied
for their formal qualities and communicative and material effects.
Law is, of course, much more than that. It is an understatement to
say that the breadth of law's possible manifestations is vast.21 So
what are we talking about when we talk about popular culture and
law? 22 The nature of interdisciplinarity itself, as well as the pace at
which this interdiscipline of law and culture is growing, dictates
careful attention to the designation of subject matter about which we
speak. This is not only so that we can proceed with a measure of
clarity, but also so that as scholars, we can compare and test our
analyses against one another. Demarcating our terms and attending
to the analytic methodologies of the disciplines from which we draw
(including, for example, a focus on one of the modalities of cultural
analysis described above: production, reception or representation)
will foster even more productive and innovative scholarship in an
already very exciting field.23

20. Naomi Mezey, Law As Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 35 (2001).
21. In fact, this author has previously discussed some of the varying methods of studying
law and culture:
The following incomplete list only illustrates this point, as well as the further point
that any study of law and culture will benefit from clarity by designating the field(s) of
law in which it is participating. Law may be conceived as positive enactment (i.e.,
documentary, as it exists in statutes, constitutions, judicial decisions, regulations). Law
may be studied as the embodiment of eternal and universal truths. For some, the
practices of legal actors and institutions are the crucial part of the law. For constitutive
theorists, law is implicated in the vast array of social phenomena as but one aspect of
the social fabric that shapes and gives meaning to our interactions. Law can be defined
as the legitimate use of force. It is also studied as that which contains arbitrariness in
social life.
Silbey, Doing Law and PopularCulture, supra note 2, at 147 n.7.
22. Id. at 147.
23. This is not to suggest that as law and culture scholars we must cover the vast terrain of
"what law is." To the contrary, we should only (or at least) define the kind of law or the
manifestation of law we are studying-be it criminal trials, positive enactments or whatever.
James Boyd White's writing is exemplary of the field in that he focuses on one aspect of the life
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II. LAW AND FILM STUDIES

The discipline of law and film is itself a subfield of law and
popular culture. As such, it reflects the methodological inquiries
mentioned above. There are law and film scholars who are primarily
concerned with the ways in which law and legal processes are
represented in film, what might be analogized to "law-in-film"
scholars. 4 Exploring the contours of law and legal questions in film
resembles more familiar jurisprudential debates about how law
should or should not regulate and order our worlds by critiquing the
way it does so in the film.25 There are also law and film scholars
who investigate how law films constitute a legal culture beyond the
film-that is, how film's peculiar ways of world making shape our
expectations of law and justice in our world at large.26 Some of these
law and film scholars pay particular attention to film's visual
embodiment of legal discourse in culture, focusing on the technology
of the moving image (as opposed to the written text) as a uniquely
powerful way of telling stories and creating (or sustaining) particular
aspects of social relations.27 Other scholars focus on the way in
which film, like law, is a means through which communities form
and pass judgment, law being a process of judgment and film being a
medium through which we are subconsciously made to judge the

of law-its textual manifestation-and investigates its broad ramifications on social life and the
pursuit of justice. See generally WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 6.
24. ANTHONY CHASE, MOVIES ON TRIAL: THE LEGAL SYSTEM ON THE SILVER SCREEN

(The New Press 2002) (1948) (describing films about law as a vehicle to explore popular beliefs
about law and politics); LEGAL REELISM: MOVIES AS LEGAL TEXTS (John Denvir ed., 1996)
(collection of essays discussing film stories about law). Both of these books are most akin to the
law-in-literature approach. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98
YALE L.J. 1579 (1989).
25.

ORIT KAMIR, FRAMED: WOMEN IN LAW AND FILM (2006) (reading "law films" as

feminist critiques of power struggles in law to imagine a more inclusive, compassionate legal
order).
26. See, e.g., CYNTHIA LUCIA, FRAMING FEMALE LAWYERS: WOMEN ON TRIAL IN FILM

(2005) (showing how the genre of the female lawyer film both emboldens and undermines
women's authority in law and society); Norman Rosenberg, Hollywood on Trials: Courts and
Films, 1930-1960, 12 LAW & HIST. REV. 341 (1994); Jessica Silbey, Patterns of Courtroom
Justice, 28 J.L. & SOC'Y 97 (2001) [hereinafter Silbey, Patternsof CourtroomJustice].
27. See LUCIA, supra note 26; Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 6;
Silbey, Judges As Film Critics, supra note 5; Silbey, Patternsof Courtroom Justice, supra note
26; see also DAVID A. BLACK, LAW IN FILM: RESONANCE AND REPRESENTATION (Univ. of I11.

Press 1999) (1959) (discussing the implications of representing court procedures in film and the
cultural connections between cinematic and legal practices).
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film characters and their actions. 28 In both of these latter approaches,
fairly analogized to a film-as-law approach,29 film and law are
compared as epistemological systems, formidable social practices
that, when combined, are exceptionally effective in defining what we
think we know, what we believe we should expect, and what we dare
hope for in a society that promises ordered liberty.3"
The film-as-law approach to a cultural analysis of law through
film engages most directly with the tripartite methodology of cultural
studies. Generally, the discipline of film studies approaches the
institution of cinema in light of its history and its formal attributes.
The history of cinema includes its history of production, circulation
and reception; film scholars consider that crucial to interpreting film
texts and understanding film's role in society is an understanding of
how film's mode of production, means of circulation and popular
reception existed at specific times and how these attributes of the
institution have evolved over time.3" The study of film's formal
qualities (a feature of production) would include attention to a film's
narrative arc, casting choices, visual patterns, and camera techniques
as a way of interpreting the individual text and its place in a canon of
like films (film genre). These approaches to film as a cultural object,
especially as the film's subject may be concerned with law and
justice, help elucidate the popular representation of law-in-film and
constitute the subject of film (its audience and community).
Importantly, this method of analysis also contextualizes both the
institutions of film and law in light of their formal limitations at
specific historical time periods. These limitations may relate to
internal attributes of film and law (e.g., visual qualities of film and
law's adjudicative process), the reception and dissemination of film
and law (e.g., theatrical releases and serialized court reporting), or
particular modes of production of film and law (e.g., large film crews
28. KAMIR, supra note 25; Jennifer L. Mnookin, Reproducing a Trial: Evidence and Its
Assessment in ParadiseLost, in LAW ON THE SCREEN 153 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2005).
29. 1 deliberately reverse the nouns here. Whereas law-as-literature is a study of law as a
rhetoric, a discourse akin to literary discourse, film-as-law is a study of filmic practices that are as
pervasive and effective as legal ones in the ways in which they influence and inspire social order.
30. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (discussing rights enumerated in the first
ten amendments to the Constitution as crucial to the "essence of ordered liberty"), overruled on
other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
31. A canonical example in film studies of this approach is DAVID BORDWELL ET AL., THE
CLASSICAL HOLLYWOOD CINEMA: FILM STYLE & MODE OF PRODUCTION TO 1960 (1985).
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and politically appointed judges). Attending to any one aspect of this
kind of cultural analysis of film-as-law will both demarcate the
boundaries of analysis (in order to situate and evaluate the truth
claims that are produced from it) and identify the social subject of
law and of film (the citizen, the moviegoer, and his or her

community).
I come to the field of film-as-law with a particular
preoccupation. My interest is in trial films specifically, and thus the

facet of law I investigate is the jury trial and its embodiment on
screen.

2

I have elsewhere contended that the American trial and the

art of cinema share certain epistemological tendencies based on
common formal attributes and their powerful effect on social
relations.33 Both stake claims to an authoritative form of knowledge
based on the indubitable quality of observable phenomena, and both

are preoccupied (sometimes to the point of self-defeat) with
sustaining the authority that underlies the knowledge produced by
visual perception."
The American trial and art of cinema also
increasingly share cultural space. Although the trial film (otherwise
known as the courtroom drama35 ) is as old as the medium of film,36
the recent spate of popular trial films, be they fictional such as

32. See, e.g., Silbey, Patternsof CourtroomJustice, supra note 26, at 97.
33. See, e.g., Jessica Silbey, A History of Representations of Justice: Coincident
Preoccupationsof Law and Film, in REPRESENTATIONS OF JUSTICE (Antoine Masson & Kevin
O'Connor eds.) (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Silbey, A History].
34. Id. The cinema brought its audience the novelty of moving image qualities, the
significance of which is rooted in the ideological and yet overdetermined relationship between the
image seen on film and the event that was filmed. From its beginnings in 1895, cinema generally
(and the trial films specifically) were preoccupied with what it means to know through sight, with
the relation between witnessing an event and judging its truthfulness and authenticity. The
mythic story of film's birth begins on December 28, 1895, during a showing of Auguste and
Louis Lumiere's L 'Arriv~e d'un Train En Gare-a short film of a train arriving into a station.
ARRIVAL OF A TRAIN AT THE STATION (Lumiere 1895). The film camera was positioned on the
quay such that on screen the train grows larger and larger as it enters the station. Apparently,
when the film audience saw the train coming toward them, unaccustomed to the illusion of reality
that film creates, the audience members feared for their lives and ran from the theater. This
inaugurated the notion that film creates a peculiarly persuasive reality, producing in the audience
the experience of bearing witness to some real event on screen. Silbey, Filmmaking in the
PrecinctHouse, supra note 6, at 143 (citing GERALD MAST & BRUCE F. KAWIN, THE MOVIES: A
SHORT HISTORY 22 (1996)).
35. Silbey, Patternsof Courtroom Justice, supra note 26, at 97 (defining "trial film").
36. Silbey, A History, supra note 33 (describing the first trial film as Falsely Accused from
1907, only twelve years after the birth of film (citing Carol Clover, God Bless Juries, in
REFIGURING AMERICAN FILM GENRES 259 (N. Browne ed., 1998))).
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Runaway Jury37 or documentary such as Capturing the Friedmans,38

suggests more then a trend; 39 it suggests an inherent affinity between
law and film that I elsewhere contend has existed since the birth of
film in 1895.40

The affinity of law and film lies in their mutual manufacture of
truth through strategies of representation and storytelling (film and
trials), and also in the power of these truth claims to structure and
regulate social relations. Film, no less than law, changes our
perceptions of reality; it shapes our understanding of the world. The
power of both film and law derives at first from the intensity of the
personal faith in believing what we see (bearing witness and judging
based on the act of witnessing). But both film and law bolster their
authority with a common storytelling feature that reflects on the
limits of their authoritative endeavor.4 Early film masters taught
that film in large part constructs a world and experience by exposing
its storytelling mechanisms that play on the hermeneutics of sight.42
In this way, the power and influence of film derives from its selfreflexive, often self-critical, qualities.43 By exposing the ways in
which cinema is just another form of storytelling, the film's self-

37. RUNAWAY JURY (New Regency Pictures & Epsilon Motion Pictures 2003).
38. CAPTURING THE FRIEDMANS (HBO Documentary Films & Notorious Pictures 2003).
39. Just by way of example of the trend, consider the following trial films of the past decade:
A TIME TO KILL (Regency Enterprises & Warner Bros. Pictures 1996), SLEEPERS (Warner Bros.
Pictures et al. 1996), MIDNIGHT IN THE GARDEN OF GOOD AND EVIL (Warner Bros. Pictures et al.
1997), A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone Pictures et al. 1998), ERIN BROCKOVICH (Jersey Films
2000), RETURN TO INNOCENCE (Lifeline Entertainment 2001), MURDER ON A SUNDAY MORNING
(Maha Productions et al. 2001), LEGALLY BLONDE (Marc Plat Productions & Metro-GoldwynMayer 2001), SNAP DECISION (Lifetime Television broadcast 2001), CHICAGO (Miramax Films
et al. 2002), INTOLERABLE CRUELTY (Imagine Entertainment et al. 2003), AILEEN: LIFE AND
DEATH OF A SERIAL KILLER (Lafayette Films 2003), THE LIFE OF DAVID GALE (Universal
Pictures et al. 2003), THE STAIRCASE (Maha Productions 2004), NORTH COUNTRY (Warner Bros.
Pictures et al. 2005), THE EXORCISM OF EMILY ROSE (Lakeshore Entertainment 2005).
40. See Silbey, Filmmaking in the PrecinctHouse, supra note 6, at 143.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 143-44.
43. The quintessential early example is Georges Melies' 1903 film The Magic Lantern, a
story on film about how film tells stories. THE MAGIC LANTERN (Georges Melies 1903). The
Magic Lantern purports to tell "the history of Western dramatic art, showing first a landscape
painting, then a play, and then an image of the newly developed moving pictures." Silbey,
Judges As Film Critics, supra note 5, at 536. Film, Melies taught, is no more than the next step in
the evolution of cultural (and largely fictional) forms; Melies also taught that film's self-reflexive
qualities-exposing the audience to the film's own ways of worldmaking and thereby involving
the audience in the illusions created-is central to film's authoritative claim. Id. at 536-37.
Melies' point was to show how film does not reveal the world, but constructs it. Id.
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critique is experienced as empowering the audience to be better
judges of stories, to stand apart from the film and question the
images it projects. Presented with the singular story on film, but also
with the critical perspective to evaluate its delivery, the audience
nonetheless experiences the film version of the story as credible and
inescapable.
Cinema's play on the hermeneutics of seeing and believing and
its self-reflexive tendencies raise questions of the epistemic
foundations of filmic representation. This same dynamic exists in
law and its processes as regards the relationship between evidence
and judgment. As with film, the trial process is based on the
believability of observable phenomena, on seeing, bearing witness
and judging. And much like stories told on film, the story that
evolves in a courtroom and through the evidentiary process is
emboldened with the privileged status of truth because of its basis on
observation." Like film language, legal processes are self-reflexive
and recursive in nature; by reflecting on the possibility of multiple
and conflicting stories (the essence of the trial) and asking jurors to
judge those stories, or by exposing legal judgments to appeal and
citing those judgments as precedents, law exposes its own recursive
storytelling mechanism and reflects on the difficulty of claiming
certain knowledge.45 The legal process nevertheless concludes with
judgment that is both authoritative and (most often) backed by
popular belief. In this way, as with film, the legal trial sustains the
knowledge it produces (the "knowledge" of guilt or innocence, for
example) with the authority of self-critique, such that the trial's
outcome (as with the filmic version) is often perceived as the most
persuasive account of "what happened."
44. See Mnookin, supra note 28, at 154-55.
45. See Silbey, Doing Law and Popular Culture, supra note 2, at 156-57 (describing how
the "truth" has less to do with criminal legal process than one might think). For the proposition
that legal trials are not about finding the truth but about some other good, see Charles Nesson,
The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proofand the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1357, 1359 (1985) (noting that the purpose of adjudication is to produce "acceptable
verdicts"). See also Chris William Sanchirico, CharacterEvidence and the Object of Trial, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1230 (2001) ("[The] rules governing what happens inside the courtroom
can be understood adequately only in the context of the state's central project of regulating
behavior outside the courtroom .. " (emphasis omitted)); Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter,
NaturalizedEpistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REv. 1491, 1500 (2001) ("Federal
Rule [of Evidence] 102 defines the 'purpose' of the rules as 'that the truth may be ascertained,'
but some of the rules themselves have no veritistic dimension, while others mix veritistic and
non-veritistic concerns." (footnotes omitted)).
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The irony is palpable. While both law and film (the trial film
and courtroom adjudication) rely on the incontrovertibility of
observations to tell their stories, these stories manage to convince
their addressees that no story is undeniable. At the same time, the
overwhelming influence of both cinema and law in our culture is to
tell the definitive story. One of my ongoing projects is to situate this
phenomenon, both to better investigate this irony and explain what I
believe to be its implications.
III. FILM'S TRUTH TALES
In contrast to truth tales, classic trial films are primarily
fictional, such as Anatomy of a Murder,46 Witness for the
47 or To Kill a Mockingbird.a
Prosecution,
" In these classic trial films,
their self-conscious form-the film's formal self-reflexive qualities
and law's explicit procedural contingencies-facilitates in the
spectator a critique of filmic and legal authority, which in turn
emboldens the spectator in her pursuit of justice through law.49 The
self-consciousness of trial films is also a consistent thematic feature;
it is a metaphor of law's relation to justice.5" As the film camera
consistently places the viewing audience in diverse relationships
within the law's drama-as a juror, attorney, judge, plaintiff or
defendant-the film as a whole encourages both an investment in the
trial's outcome as well as a detachment from any one particular point
of view. 1 The spectator can thus claim to know the result that is
most just by virtue of her privileged multiperspective knowledge of
the nuances of the case, as well as condemn the faults of a system
which has nevertheless enabled her privileged insertion into the
debate. 2 In these films, justice is reproduced through the visual
metaphor of courtroom drama as a convergence of these many
46. ANATOMY OF AMURDER (Carlyle Productions & Columbia Pictures Corp. 1959).
47. WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION (Edward Small Productions 1957).
48. TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Brentwood Productions et al. 1962).
49. I have elsewhere called the effect of this recursive authority the "liberal legal subject" of
trial films. See Silbey, Patterns of Justice, supra note 26, at 98. This effect occurs when the
film's exposure of its own fiction and of the limitations of law's processes strengthens the
spectator's claim to authority and autonomy in the face of both film's constitutive force and law's
power. Id.
50. Id. at 115.
51. Id. at 116.
52. Id. at 111-12.
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perspectives toward an inevitable result. 3 As a quest for a missing
puzzle piece, this play in the house of law about dichotomous moral
decisions concerning right and wrong actions, corrupt or honest
people, and good or bad laws. 4 This notion of legality perceives a
world already there; the truth of classic trial films sits in some pure
form waiting to be found. The viewer is constituted within the
unfolding drama to facilitate (through desire) the revelation of a truth
that will enable a just result, and he thus experiences justice as the
exposure of that one truth that will rid the disease from an otherwise
healthy process.5 This usually manifests itself during or after a
56
climactic trial scene. Consider Witness for the Prosecution,
Anatomy of a Murder,57 or even the more recent JaggedEdge, 5' all of

which culminate in the revelation of the identity of the true murderer
at the end of the film in court or just after court.
By contrast, in truth tales such as JFK,59 Helter Skelter,60 and
North Country,6 the film's self-conscious form works differently.
Truth tales (and other nonfiction-like films, such as documentaries62 )
do not aim to reveal a certain truth either through legal process or
film form. Despite claims that these films are based on a legal event
in history, most often a historical or otherwise notorious trial, the
story of truth tales is not necessarily about a particular pursuit of
justice with a singular revelation of a guilty or innocent identity, but

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 112.
Id.
Id. at 115-16.
WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION, supra note 47.

57. ANATOMY OF A MURDER, supra note 46.
58. JAGGED EDGE (Columbia Pictures Co. & Delphi IV Productions 1985).
59. JFK (Warner Bros. Pictures et al. 1991).
60. HELTER SKELTER (Lorimar Productions 1976).
61. NORTH COUNTRY, supra note 39.
62. Courtroom dramas based on true stories are distinct from documentary trial films, such
as CAPTURING THE FRIEDMANS, supra note 38, or MURDER ON A SUNDAY MORNING, supra note
39. Whereas COMPULSION, supra note 3, and SWOON, supra note 4, are fictionalized accounts of
a notorious trial, the recent spate of documentaries about contemporary trials, of which Capturing
the Friedmans is just one, are nonfictional accounts of relatively unknown legal cases. In many
instances, these documentaries are personal accounts, versions of the filmic biography and
autobiography made possible by the explosion of camcorders, personal film cameras and digital
photography. These new film forms and the contrasting categories of fiction versus nonfiction
(or docudrama versus documentary) affect the meaning produced by both film genres in terms of
the role of law in attaining justice (the importance of truth and fairness). See Silbey, A History,
supra note 33.
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about how that pursuit can be retold in various ways, how justice
manifests itself in diverse forms.
Truth tales are explicit
comparisons between the story that was told long ago (the notorious
verdict with which the audience is familiar), and the story as it can be
retold and resituated on film today. In this way, these truth tales are
a kind of appeal, attempting to correct a popular perception. Like
classic trial films, truth tales operate within a self-conscious
framework, but the self-consciousness does not encourage or critique
the participation of individuals within that legal system as much as it
serves to reflect the film's and law's constitution of history. These
films are less about verdict qua truth, and more about how film and
law are constitutive social processes-how there is not one "true"
story to be told about a singular event in time. It is these truth tales
that complicate the notion of discovering a certain truth through law
to which Parts IV and V of this article are primarily devoted.
Despite the truth tales' critique of singular truth claims, truth
tales share a set of formal features less like those of fictional trial
films and more like those of traditional documentary films.63 Like
documentaries, truth tales establish an expectation of faithfulness to
past events through specific formal features coded to signal the
"live" or the "real." '
One of these formal features is a promise,
made at the film's beginning, that it is based on a true story, such as
"The following motion picture was inspired by a true story" (which
opens the film Judgment in Berlin).65 Documentaries and truth tales
also rely on black and white footage to index informational and
factual film coverage, the purpose of which is to cultivate the
63. For a general discussion of documentary film style and history, see BILL NICHOLS,
TO DOCUMENTARY
(2001) [hereinafter NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION TO
DOCUMENTARY]. See also Silbey, Filmmaking in the PrecinctHouse, supra note 6, at 142-55.
64. The "live" would include the generic markers of documentary, for example, the "reality
effect" and people "being themselves," or "dead" and "empty" time as Bill Nichols has written in
his book Representing Reality. BILL NICHOLS, REPRESENTING REALITY: ISSUES AND CONCEPTS
INTRODUCTION

IN DOCUMENTARY 13, 40 (1991) [hereinafter NICHOLS, REPRESENTING REALITY].

As Nichols

has also said, however, these signs-symbols of photographic realism-are "not, in fact a truth
but a style." NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION TO DOCUMENTARY, supra note 63, at 92.
65. JUDGMENT IN BERLIN (Sheen/Greenblatt Productions et al. 1988). Consider also the
beginning of Helter Skelter: "You are about to see a dramatization of actual facts in which some
of the names have been changed but the story is true. If it were not true, it would not be
believable, for it is surely one of the most bizarre chapters in the history of crime .... HELTER
SKELTER, supra note 60. There are, of course, some films that do not require a red flag to signal
their reliance on historical events, such as JFK, supra note 59, THE TRIAL OF THE CATONSVILLE
NINE (Melville Productions 1972), and SACCO AND VANZETTI (Italonegglio Cinematografico et
al. 1971).
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viewer's trust as regards the film's truth value. Many truth tales
even incorporate black and white newsreel footage of the event in
question or coverage of news broadcasts announcing to television
audiences the details of the crime. Also, many truth tales employ
handheld cameras, first person testimony, and what appears to be
amateur film footage (footage that is unfocused, off-balance and hard
to hear) evoking the sense of unedited, unadulterated film. This
creates the appearance of a camera-witness that was merely present
(and not "manipulated") to capture the event. As theorists of
documentary films have already noted, however, these formal
features say nothing about the inherent truth value of the film. These
features are simply well-recognized codes whose purpose is to tell
the viewer that the film is based on fact.66
Whereas in documentaries these formal features of the "live"
and the "real" might signify immediateness and faithfulness of
representation (whether or not that is the case),67 in truth tales the
same formal features highlight the inevitability of fiction in legal
stories based on fact. As will be shown later in Parts IV and V, the
truth in truth tales is not the coincidence of the filmic representation
with its historic referent (a sense of bearing witness and originating
evidence), but the understanding that filmic versions of the past are
always a fictional telling-a remaking of history with contemporary
filmic conventions and for contemporary audiences.
66. See NICHOLS, REPRESENTING REALITY, supra note 64, at 32-75. Nichols delves into
the subgenres of documentary, dividing them into the "observational mode," the "expository
mode," the "reflexive mode," and the "interactive mode," all which differently manipulate the
viewer's expectations of the indexical relation of the film's images to the historical world.
However, all modes share the common feature of the "basic expectation held by the documentary
viewer... that the desire to know will find gratification during the course of the film." Id. at 30.
67. This is especially so in observational documentaries, despite the fact that the relationship
between the feeling of authenticity and the fact of authenticity is entirely stylistic and
conventional. See NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION TO DOCUMENTARY, supra note 63, at 92-93; see
also Silbey, Filmmaking in the PrecinctHouse, supra note 6, at 144. "[T]he 'realism' of early
documentary film was a constructed reality, one intentionally conjured by the film (and
filmmaker) to project onto and reproduce in its viewing audience a specific rendering of how
,reality' might look and feel." Silbey, Filmmaking in the PrecinctHouse, supra note 6, at 144.
68. Indeed, many documentaries--even those that purport to reveal something true about the
past--demonstrate the inevitability of narrative choice and point of view to shape truth claims.
Some would even say this is what documentary filmmaking has always been about. See Silbey,
Filmmaking in the PrecinctHouse, supra note 6, at 145-50.
The development of... different perspectives in documentary film provoked
significant epistemological uncertainties. One was to highlight the by-now obvious
fact that all stories, even true ones, can be truthfully told from different angles, with
different morals and objectives. Another was to enable.., a judgment by the film
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Truth tales primarily accomplish this historical comparison by
virtue of their famous conclusions. As truth tales, they were not
made to retell the ubiquitous verdict. Instead, the point of truth tales
is to resituate the story of the crime and the trial in a newly
meaningful way. The truth tale takes a story from the past whose
ending most people know well and represents it in a manner that
should make a difference in how people will remember the verdict in
the future. The difference between the truth tale and the historic trial
on which it is based cannot be uncontested facts of the case-the
verdict, for example, or the identity of the victim-but instead the
process and conditions that resulted in those facts. The renown of
the verdict shifts interest in the film from the result of the trial (the
"truth" at law) to its process as a way of making good or bad sense of
the illegal act at issue. Less concerned with law's capacity to reveal
the truth of the guilt or innocence of an individual, spectators of the
truth tale instead learn that the justice of law's process relies entirely
on one's perception of context-a time and a space that situates each
retelling of the infamous verdict. In truth tales, "truth" is not the
correctness of the legal verdict, but an understanding of the situation
that produced it.69
This notion of "truth" is very different from the thematic feature
of many classic trial films with which Part III began, such as To Kill
a Mockingbird' and Anatomy of a Murder.7 In these films, truth sits
in some pure form waiting to be found as the inevitable result of the
convergence of the film viewer's privileged perspectives.72 The
viewer of these classic courtroom dramas is constituted within the
unfolding drama to facilitate (through desire) the revelation of a truth
that will enable a just result, experiencing justice as the exposure of
audience about the authority of the film voice .... Indeed, given the combination of
factual assertions and epistemological uncertainties that were embedded in the
documentary genre from the outset, attention to documentary voice-although
varied-almost always concerns building credibility and authority for the story being
told.
Id. at 147.
69. Central to this notion of "truth" in documentary filmmaking, writes Bill Nichols, "is less
a process of 'fleshing out' on the part of the text than 'filling in' on the part of the viewer." BILL
NICHOLS, BLURRED BOUNDARIES: QUESTIONS OF MEANING IN POPULAR CULTURE 146-47

(1994).
70.

To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 48.

71. ANATOMY OF A MURDER, supra note 46.
72. See Silbey, Patterns of CourtroomJustice, supra note 26, at 111-13.
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that one truth that will rid the disease from an otherwise healthy
process.73 The culmination of truth tales that are trial films,
however-such as Judgment at Nuremberg,4 Helter Skelter,75 Inherit
the Wind,76 Reversal of Fortune7 -- cannot be the revelation of a truth
qua verdict because the verdicts in these truth tales are too famous to
create narrative suspense.7" In truth tales, the object is not to wait
and wish for the coincidence of verdict and truth. What would the
truth be of films like Judgment at Nuremberg79 or JFK?0 In these
films, the story's motivation and suspense-indeed, the relationship
of the film to its representation of law-must be structured around
something else.
That something else is not how much of the film is true and
untrue (i.e., historically accurate or inaccurate). In truth tales, the
truth functions not as an endpoint (a verdict) but as a process. By
contrast, in entirely fictional films about law, such as the classic
courtroom drama, the truth of law lies in its verdict, the outcome
around which much of the ideological play of the film and its legal
story is based. In classic trial films, their self-conscious form helps
viewers critique as an illusion film's comprehensiveness and law's
top-down authority so that the viewer may inject his perspective into
law in the name of individualized justice, eventually embracing law
as a system that can tell a true story as long as the right people are
included in the telling. In truth tales, by contrast, the law is not about
the trial's conclusion but about the reason for it as a social system.
The self-conscious form of truth tales helps constitute in viewers an
appreciation of the fictive quality of both law and film, how both are
about processes of storytelling (and worldmaking) where the "truth"
73. See supra notes 43, 45, 65 and accompanying text.
74. JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (Roxlom Films Inc. 1961).
75. HELTER SKELTER, supra note 60.
76. INHERIT THE WIND (Lomitas Productions 1960).
77. REVERSAL OF FORTUNE (Sovereign Pictures et al. 1990).
78. In contrast, consider the more commonly structured trial films like JAGGED EDGE, supra
note 58, or WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION, supra note 47, where both film narratives unfold
around the missing identity of the guilty party. The search for the murderer in both films
dovetails on the hope and faith that the trial process will serve justice-that is the truly innocent
will be set free and the guilty will be punished. Both films culminate in surprise endings,
unmasking the guilty party to vindicate the work of the attorney and to confirm faith in the law.
This schema directly contrasts with truth tales.
79. JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG, supra note 74.
80. JFK, supra note 59.

Winter 2007]

TRUTH TALES AND TRIAL FILMS

may be unknowable, if perhaps also irrelevant.8 The truth tale has as
its aim not to tell (what in documentary jargon would be) a true story
based on the culmination of multiple perspectives, but instead to
cultivate and accommodate multiple notions of truth based on
irreconcilable points of view. It does so by investigating truth as a
filmic and legal construct whose significance for justice changes
over time.
The truth tale accomplishes this aim by making plain the
distinction between the notion of law as a revelatory mechanism and
law as constitutive of society and culture. The viewer of truth tales
presumably knows the legal outcome of the case on which the film is
based, but nevertheless watches the film in anticipation of a wrinkle
in the story. Already anticipating that the film's representation of the
story-which ends in an infamous verdict-will shed new light on an
old tale, the truth tales' spectator is inaugurated into a realm of
critical historical consciousness. This historical subject watches the
film expecting a different "take"82 on what has already become
historical fact and in this way is already comfortable with the notion
that history is not a static story but a kind of (filmic) palimpsest. The
viewer is made critical not only of film's ability to capture reality (to
make any faithful claims to truthful representations), but also of
law's claim to adjudicate towards one truth-the "right result"-as it
so often promises.
This means that the film viewer's selfconsciousness services a critical stance on both filmic representation
and the legal process, not in order to enable a single verdict on the
accused, but to demur to a legal system that is as fissured and
contradictory as the individuals the law aims to categorize. The
viewer of a truth tale watches a film that claims to tell the story of a
specific historical event that nevertheless is premised on the fictive
quality of all historical accounts. In this way, the viewer is asked to
account for (to bear witness to) the changing significance of law and
legal verdicts through time.
The next two parts of this Article trace the construction of this
critical viewer by comparing two very different films that are about

81. Silbey, Doing Law and Popular Culture, supra note 2, at 156-57; also sources cited
supra note 45; Jessica Silbey, CriminalPerformances: Film, Autobiography and Confessions, 37
N.M. L. REV. I (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Silbey, CriminalPerformances].
82. 1intend the double-entendre as in both "take" in film jargon and "take" in opinion.
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the same legal trial, the Leopold-Loeb case from Chicago in 1924.83
The case concerns the premeditated murder of a young teenage boy
by two teenagers, Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb. The case was
notorious for many reasons. The prosecutors searched in vain for a
motive and found none. Although the defendants confessed to the
murder, the best explanation for their actions was thrill-seeking.84
The boys were represented by Clarence Darrow, who successfully
argued to spare them the death penalty.85 Many films were made
about the case, including Compulsion,86 a 1959 film starring Dean
Stockwell and Orson Welles, and Swoon,"7 a 1991 film by Tom
Kalin.88 Compulsion is shot in classic Hollywood style. Swoon is
more avant-garde and stars a cast of fledgling actors. Both films
borrow heavily from uncontested facts of the Leopold-Loeb case but
they are nonetheless drastically different in film form and narrative
focus.
The analysis of Compulsion and Swoon in Parts IV and V
attends primarily to the film form itself-to style, technique and
narrative. Also relevant to the analysis is the relation of these films
as a category to other similar genres, namely the documentary and
the classic trial film. This is, therefore, an analysis from the
perspective of cultural production and reception, two of the three
prongs of a cultural analysis of legal representation. My claim is that
the effect of truth tales as a genre is to instill an open mindedness as
regards the changing meaning of verdicts over time. In comparison
to classic trial films that cultivate in their viewers the desire for law
to reveal a truth as a means of achieving justice, these truth tales, by
embracing multiple ways of telling a similar story, celebrate law (and
whatever truths it seeks) as a constitutive process whose truth claims

83. For an accessible discussion of the Leopold and Loeb case, see GILBERT GElS & LEIGH
B. BIENEN, CRIMES OF THE CENTURY 13-47 (1998).
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id. at 17-20. In Compulsion, Orson Welles played Jonathan Wilk, the fictional character
of Clarence Darrow, an attorney who was famous in his own right as the criminal defense
attorney who represented (among others) John Scopes in what became known as the "Scopes
monkey trial" defending a school teacher's ability to teach Darwin's theory of evolution.
86. COMPULSION, supra note 3.
87. SWOON, supra note 4.
See ROPE
88. Alfred Hitchcock's Rope is also based on the Leopold-Loeb case.
(Transatlantic Pictures & Warner Bros. Pictures 1948).
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(guilt or innocence) are contingent on cultural and historical
circumstances.
Both films employ self-conscious film form to critique
hegemonic representational strategies of film. Both films also draw
on that self-consciousness to critique the power and influence of law
that threatens individual liberty. The films nonetheless conclude
with different versions of law's constitutive force in society with
regard to the Leopold-Loeb case. The viewer of Compulsion is made
to account for the potential hypocrisy in a legal system that calls for
the premeditated death of two young men convicted of killing in cold
blood. The viewer of Swoon is made aware of the homophobia that
served as a specious explanation of Leopold's and Loeb's antisocial
and criminal personalities. Side-by-side the resulting effect of these
films is to demonstrate the possibility for the same trial and the same
verdict to mean different things. Their self-conscious form does not
lead to revelation of any one truth (why the boys committed murder
and how), but instead that the significance of the case (insofar as
verdict is concerned) is ongoing. The aim of Parts IV and V is
therefore to show how truth tales affect a film viewer (and a legal
subject) who is conscious of history's dynamic moral narratives, and
who accepts law's capacity for contradiction and change, especially
as concerns the relation of justice to the outcome of legal
adjudication.89
IV.

COMPULSION

Compulsion is structured around a system of visual symbols and
symbols of vision-eyeglasses, headlights, newspapers-that
establish expectations of the film's allegiance to empirical
knowledge and historical accuracy. These signs that are symbolic of
revelation and understanding also point to the film's self-conscious
fictionalization (retelling through narrative and visual imagery) of
the Leopold and Loeb story. The film viewer, who knows the guilty
verdict and also experiences the intrigue of the film's narrative, is
made able to critique the film's claim to historical accuracy that
makes plain the interdependence of historical circumstance with
89. Sociolegal scholars have been making this claim for some time: that as legal agents we
may accept the law not as a system of truth and justice, but as a game we can play, shape and
manipulate. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW at xii-xiii (1998)

(describing the mapping of "complex and contradictory fabric of legality").

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:551

legal outcomes. In the end, the film viewer accounts not for the facts
of the Leopold-Loeb case (e.g., a static verdict: are the defendants
guilty or not?), but for law's evolving role in the ordering of society
over time (e.g., the propriety of the death penalty: should the
defendants have been spared?).
The theatrical trailer to Compulsion, the film preview that
advertised the film to movie going audiences, begins the film's
discursive mixing of documentary style with fiction filmmaking. It
shows scenes from the film and then freezes on a shot of a speakeasy
in which the two main characters and their school chums are
drinking whiskey. The announcer in the trailer breaks with the
diegesis of the film and addresses the audience, "Ladies and
Gentlemen! We stop this film deliberately to tell you that two of the
young people you are watching have just committed what has
become the crime of the century .. ."90 The two young people are
not Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold, however, but the actors
Bradford Dillman and Dean Stockwell playing Arty Strauss and Judd
Steiner. The promise to show the film audience the defendants is
therefore complex.
The celebrity actors make the spectator
immediately aware that the film is not a documentary. And yet, the
announcer promises a tell-all movie experience, presuming the
successful conflation of the film's inherent fiction with its revelatory
feeling of being rooted in historical facts (the activities and trial of
the two teenage murderers, Leopold and Loeb). An audience going
to see Compulsion would expect, from this trailer, to be entertained
by the likes of Stockwell and Orson Welles as well as educated about
the historical circumstances of the Leopold-Loeb case.
The announcer ends his introduction by asking "Do you know
the strange relationship that existed between them?" This is an
explicit invitation to investigate and scrutinize the film for the
answer-to expect from the film a persuasive and candid analysis of

90. This is a form of "breaking the fourth wall," a technique that was originally theorized by
Bertolt Brecht through his theory of epic theater and the "alienation effect." ROBERT STAM ET
AL., NEW VOCABULARIES IN FILM SEMIOTICS 198-201 (1992).

"Breaking the fourth wall"

involves actors breaking with their character to directly address the audience, thereby breaking
the illusion of reality that the theater (or film) creates and "making strange" the previously very
real-feeling experience of the play (or film) before them. See id. The experience is of at once
realizing that what you're seeing is fiction, but believing what you see to be authentic and true
based on the personal and direct address of the actor. See id.
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the Leopold-Loeb case. 9
A screen shot of Meyer Levin's
semiautobiographical book Compulsion92 (also about the LeopoldLoeb case) buttresses the announcer's promise.93 Meyer Levin's
book was heralded as a "significant and moving work"94 and as
"accurate and vivid"95 when it came out three years prior to the
film.96 The image of the book is superimposed over shots of frantic
newspaper printing presses. The book's reputation, in combination
with the sense of immediate and reliable news, builds the
announcer's credibility and thus also the believability of the film
images that follow.
The film's referential claims and its revelatory promises are
nevertheless complicated by the theatricality of the trailer. The
trailer is carefully crafted, pasting scenes together from the film,
framing them with a whirlpool-effect overlay. Each scene looks like
the eye of a tornado as seen from above the clouds looking down at
the storm; around the film's edges swirls white mist, keeping the
audience's eyes focused on and grateful for the clarity of the
whirlpool's center. After introducing the Leopold-Loeb case as "the
91. Although the invitation rings of the homophobia surrounding the Leopold-Loeb case, as
will be discussed later, Compulsion doesn't explain the "strangeness" of the two young men's
relationship as homoerotic love but instead as narcissism and ego-mania.
92. MEYER LEVIN, COMPULSION (Frederick Muller 1957).
93. The film Compulsion is specifically credited to the book Compulsion (1956) written by
Meyer Levin, which predates the film by three years. Levin's book claims to be historical fiction.
Meyer Levin was a school friend of both Leopold and Loeb and cast himself in the book as the
reporter, Sid Silver, who helped crack the criminal case. He writes in his autobiography of the
impact the Leopold-Loeb case had on his young adulthood. "The murder stood before me as a
personal lesson in morality .... In a confused and awed way, and in the momentary
fashionableness of 'lust for experience,' I felt that I understood them, that I, particularly, being a
young intellectual Jew, had a kinship with them." Charles Shapiro, The Crime of Our Age,
NATION, Dec. 1, 1956, at 483. This kinship gave Levin what he considered the authority and
credibility to write so persuasively about what has elsewhere been called one of the "crimes of the
century." GEIS & BIENEN, supra note 83.
94. Shapiro, supra note 93.
95. Books for Christmas, Book Review, NATION, Dec. 15, 1956, at 199.
96. Meyer made no claims to complete historical accuracy in his book, although it was
nevertheless considered a major breakthrough in the understanding and significance of the
Leopold-Loeb case. "To its telling, Levin brings a compelling creative power rooted in both
subjectivity and objectivity. As a campus contemporary of the two criminals .... he writes with
the immediacy and intimacy of firsthand knowledge of the principals of the case." Book Review,
N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Oct. 28, 1956, at 5. "Since this is a novel, Mr. Levin has used fictitious
names throughout, yet he follows the established facts of the Loeb-Leopold case so closely that
any libelous statement would still be actionable." Book Review, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1956, at 7.
Ironically enough, Nathan Leopold did sue Meyer Levin for libel many years after the book was
published and the film released. Leopold lost the lawsuit.
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story that electrified the world," this creative whirlpool effect
encourages the feeling of a clarification and a culmination. It says
that this film version is the latest in groundbreaking news.
Blindingly bright car headlights that illuminate the screen begin the
opening montage. As the car drives toward the audience, the lights
get larger and whiter. Themes of sharp focus (the tunnel effect of the
tornado) and enlightenment (headlights) further the message that the
film will be eye-opening. The trailer closes with the additional
endorsement that the film's producer, Darryl Zanuck, "pioneered
some of the most daring subject matter the screen has ever known."
This film will be Zanuck's coup-de-grdce. Not only will it be
shocking because it is based on a true story, but because it will
expose more about the Leopold-Loeb case than any previous
account.
Although the trailer depends on the images of newspapers,
investigative reporting and the symbolism of enhanced vision to
convince the audience of its search for the truth of the Leopold-Loeb
case, it nevertheless embellishes its pronouncements with the allure
of stars like Orson Welles and Diane Varsi. Also, the trailer does not
look like a news announcement despite its attempt to signify the truth
value of news. Many films from this time period might show a cover
story from a local paper announcing the crime to be investigated or
live film footage from an arrest or arraignment.97 Instead, this trailer
is a very carefully edited film sequence that makes no qualms about
Despite the
sensationalizing an already scandalous story.9"
expectations of truthfulness this trailer encourages, its splashy
introductory form frames these expectations with exaggerated and
imaginative filmic devices.
The film builds on the documentary expectations established in
its theatrical trailer by weaving its narrative around the symbolism of
a pair of eyeglasses and a newspaper investigation-both signifiers
of learning and knowledge that dovetail on the trailer's truth claims
and highlight the film's self-conscious form. The eyeglasses and
newspaper investigation index the desire to see and know all that is
possible about the Leopold-Loeb case. What is shown in this film,

97. BORDWELL, supra note 31, at 24-41.
98. The fact that the film is specifically indebted to the book by Meyer Levin seals its fate as
both an objective and subjective account of the Leopold-Loeb case.
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however, is not the story of the planning and murder of young Bobby
Franks, the victim of Leopold's and Loeb's passion for crime, but the
story of Leopold's and Loeb's attempt and failure to cover-up their
crime. In Compulsion, the audience never sees the murder or its
planning. Instead, the audience watches as Arty and Judd craft
mendacious alibis and furnish the police with others to mislead the
investigation. Given that the story is about the power of lies, what
then is the point of the film's symbolic structure around clarity of
vision and factual reporting?
The reoccurring visual and narrative themes of the missing
eyeglasses (a breakthrough clue in the murder case), which is iterated
in the film as car headlights in some scenes and as the blind eyes of a
teddy bear in others, is one mark of the film's self-conscious form
that highlights its own fictionalized storytelling mechanism. By
telling a story about a criminal investigation that must negotiate a
swamp of lies and by arming its audience with the knowledge of the
investigation's conclusion (the guilt of the accused), the film
maintains its suspense through the intrigue and ingenuity of the
fabricated stories and not with the anticlimactic revelation of the
murderers' identities, whom everyone knows already from the film's
beginning. In this way, the eyeglasses and newspaper reporting do
not stand for the infallibility of empirical investigations, but
ironically for the diverse and persuasive narratives such
investigations can produce. Likewise, the film, which promises to be
an expos6, produces its own critique of the possibility that film
(which is a kind of bearing witness) exposes any singular truth at all.
Indeed, from beginning to end, the film contrasts expectations of
truthfulness with fantastic filmmaking. Two central devices for this
contrast are the symbolic narratives revolving around Judd's
eyeglasses that he lost at the scene of the crime and a newspaper
intern's investigative reporting of the murder of Bobby Franks. The
glasses form a pattern in the film that weaves scenes together and
draws the connection between lost sight and criminal culpability.
The glasses are eventually traced to Judd, the one mistake in their
masterful plan. Found by a newspaper intern, Sid, the glasses are
wrongly perceived to be his first big break as an investigative
reporter. Sid follows the case to its culmination in pleas of guilty;
and the film audience follows his progress on the case, forcing a
contrast between Sid's misleading discoveries with what they know
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to be the details of the crime and cover-up. The symbolism of the
eyeglasses together with the newspaper investigation highlight the
motivated relationship between sight (empirical investigation) and
knowledge.
But the stories of eyeglasses and the newspaper
investigation fail to tell the film audience anything new. Neither is
clarifying or revelatory. As narrative devices they merely confirm
that many stories (whether the one that Arty and Judd tell about the
lost glasses or the one that Sid reports) can flow from or be crafted
around the same pieces of evidence."
The glasses, which are
symbolic of sharpened vision, and the news reporting, which stands
for the high value of empiricism, undermine rather than sustain the
film's revelatory claims. These framing devices do not enhance the
truth value of the film but instead stress the film's self-conscious
storytelling and an awareness of the inevitably constructed nature of
all stories, whether historically grounded or legally motivated.
In a later scene, the glasses serve a similarly ambivalent
purpose. When the state's prosecutor, Mr. Horn, interrogates Judd,
Mr. Horn wears glasses exactly like those Judd lost. He also shows
Judd a pair of glasses that he knows Judd lost at the murder site. The
doubleness of the glasses in the film shot-on Mr. Horn's face and in
his hand, a kind of double vision-undermines Mr. Horn's
identification of the glasses as Judd's, their style being common
enough to be shared by both the prosecutor and the accused. When
Mr. Horn explains to Judd that he knows they are his-there is a
special hinge on the frame made for only three customers in the
Chicago area, one of whom is Judd-the double vision turns into
accurate vision and the audience feels as if Mr. Horn has the upper
hand. But the discovery of Judd's glasses at the murder site is not
the evidence that seals the boys' fate. When Sid first discovered the
glasses in the autopsy room, he thought they would break open the
criminal investigation. But Judd and Arty are clever, and for most of
the film they successfully mislead the police and reporters with
complex, hard-to-verify alibis. Judd crafts a credible story about his
bird watching class, which ostensibly took place in the park in which
the murdered boy was found. He suggests that his glasses must have
99. The possibility of competing stories structured around common facts is, of course, the
essence of the trial. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRiAL 103-104, 123 (1999) (where
there are "few factual disputes," describing situation in which opening statements in a trial is a
battle over "what th[e] case is about").
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fallen when he was stumbling around the rugged terrain looking at
birds. All because of the glasses, symbolic of clarity and vision, Sid
spends substantial time following false leads.
The newspaper investigation is another red herring. It adds little
to the film's informational aura. Only a fluke statement by a family
chauffeur that he had the car the day the boys testified to using it
convinces Mr. Horn that Judd and Arty are liars and perhaps also
murderers. If anything, the film contrasts what the reporters do not
know with what the audience learns by following Arty and Judd in
their private adventures. Although the criminal investigation serves
both as a backbone of the case against the two boys and as a
narrative structure for the film, it does not propel the story's
conclusion. The glasses and the other symbols of enlightenment do
not end up revealing anything new about the murder of Bobby
Franks. They only serve to symbolically bind that film's visual story
together, a structure around which one version (or many versions) of
the story can be told.
Like so many trial films, Compulsion culminates in a climactic
trial scene. The suspense of the trial, however, is not directed at the
verdict, nor does it revolve around the investigation or evidence
mentioned above. In fact, the boys plead guilty, removing the jury
from the case. What is left to know or understand about the murder?
What is left for the role of judgment (knowing application of the law
to a set of facts in light of social codes and moral norms)? Up until
now, the film's formal self-consciousness pointed to the film's own
constructed nature, questioning the value of empiricism and
observation (acute vision and investigation) in a legal case thwarted
by clever, mean-spirited teenage boys. The self-reflexive film form
is not self-defeating, however. It does not undermine the film's
message of legal authority and judgment. Self-reflection can lead to
justice, argues the defense attorney, Jonathan Wilk (who is supposed
to be Clarence Darrow, the attorney who represented Leopold and
Loeb).
The self-reflexive nature of the film's story about vision,
knowledge and law mobilizes the film's central and climactic debate
about the cruelty of the death penalty. In the final scene, Wilk asks
the judge (and the film audience who is put in the position of the
judge with a perspective from his bench) to scrutinize the law's
justification for the death penalty with the same intensity given the
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stories that led to the defendants' confession. Despite the boys'
confessions to cold-blooded murder, and because the existence and
relevance of facts explaining the boys' actions remain elusive, the
law of punishment calling for the boys' deaths remains subject to
debate. Whereas the prosecutor argues that the death penalty exists
for precisely this kind of case-premeditated, random murder-the
defense attorney argues the opposite. The film borrows directly from
Darrow's argument in the Leopold-Loeb case asserting that for
crimes like this, the death penalty makes no sense.0 0 He tells the
judge and the film audience, "If these boys hang it must be by your
own cool deliberate act." In other words, the legal system cannot be
consistent with its principles and also plan to kill the two boys as
punishment for the premeditated murder of the young Bobby Franks.
The film emphasizes this point by having the actor playing
Clarence Darrow address the film camera directly, appearing to
confront the judge and the film audience face-to-face and close up.
By breaking with the fiction of the film and appealing directly to its
audience, as if we were the judge and jury in the case, the film
questions the line between truth and fiction, illusion and reality.'
Despite the filmic nature of the story before us and despite its status
as history, we are asked to judge and make sense of the verdict-to
have an opinion about the law's punishment and about the injustice
of the death penalty. Facing the camera, the boys' attorney says:
This court is told that it should give [the murderers] the
same mercy as they gave their victim. But your honor, if
our state is not kinder, more humane, more considerate,
more intelligent, than the mad act of these two boys, I am
sorry to have lived this long .... Through the centuries our
laws have been modified so now men look back at the
horror of hangings and killings of the past. It has been
proven that as the penalties are less barbarous, the crimes
are less frequent. Do I need to argue with your honor that
cruelty only breeds cruelty? Our religious leaders ...have
taught that if there is any way to kill evil, it is not by killing
men. If there is any way of destroying hatred... it is
100. GElS & BIENEN, supranote 83, at 19.
101. Breaking with the fiction of the film is a form of "breaking the fourth wall," which
involves actors breaking with their character to directly address the audience. See STAM ET AL.,
supra note 90.
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through charity and love and understanding .... A hanging
would be done, of course, in the name of justice. Justice?
Who knows what it is? If you hang these boys, you turn
back on the past. I'm pleading for the future.
The film addresses its audience as "you," "pleading" with its
audience to be critical of law's claim to being impartial and fair
while also advocating murder. By scrutinizing law's claim that it can
kill without committing murder, the film puts to honorable use a
sensitivity to discursive strategies (like law) which claim to hold a
monopoly on truth and justice. As the judge is finally convinced to
eschew the death penalty in this case, the audience, in the position of
judge, facilitates mercy. In so doing, the defense attorney (and the
film) shows how rhetoric alone-and not the facts, as none were
controverted-can shape a community's notion of justice.
The film's formal self-consciousness services the film's legal
conclusion. From the film's beginning, its moral narrative is the
mantra that no one is above the law-not the lawmakers, not the
super-intellects, not the legal system itself. Compulsion's selfconscious film form-a critique of discursive strategies for
representing truth and history-does not make the audience sensitive
to historical accuracy in film, but instead to the film's moral message
about law's own accountability for the social order it generates. The
film's climax neither concerns the details of the crime nor even the
idiosyncrasies of the boys' personalities. Instead, the trial is devoted
to the hypocrisy and cruelty of the death penalty in a legal system
that proclaims, "Thou shalt not kill." The final scenes in court, in
which the defense attorney argues directly to the camera (supposedly
to the judge, but also to the film audience), extends the viewer's
critique of discursive strategies to the legal system. Orson Welles
playing Jonathan Wilk as Clarence Darrow says, "We're told it was a
cold blooded killing because they planned and schemed, and yet here
are officers of the state who have planned and schemed to take these
boys' lives.... A hanging would be done, of course, in the name of
justice. Justice? Who knows what it is?" However understandable
it might be to condemn these two convicted child murderers to death,
the film viewer is now armed with an awareness of law's role in
crafting stories of condemnation and blame without also holding
itself accountable for the results of its merciless punishment. This
film poses an age-old puzzle of law's own accountability: is there
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such a thing as an ultra-vires act committed by the legal system
itself? The defense rhetoric suggests there is: as Arty and Judd must
be accountable for the immorality and illegality of their act, so too
must the court justify its impulse for eye-for-an-eye punishment.
Whatever significance the Leopold-Loeb case had for the film's
audience before watching Compulsion, the film's narrative and
formal features compel scrutiny of the legal system's penchant for
vengeance while also condemning the same in the social subjects it
disciplines. The viewer of this film-positioned throughout as skeptical of the value of legal investigation, but also as hostile to both
defendants-is nonetheless asked to cultivate a historical
consciousness sympathetic to both informing the progressive evolution of law.
After watching a feature length film structured around the
critique of documentary form and truth-telling mechanisms, a viewer
is likely to embrace this call to interpretation, to understand and
reinvent the history of crime and punishment. As Compulsion's selfconscious form critiques the defendants' alibis, the effectiveness of
the legal investigation, and the film's claim to truthfully represent
events in the past, it also evokes a critique of the law's interest in
singular truths and proportional punishments as the goal of the trial.
When the defense attorney looks up at the camera (which looks
down from the judge's bench) and concludes his speech by stating
that "Mercy is the highest attribute of man," he implores us as judges
of the legal system (and of the defendants) to reject the death penalty
as an appropriate punishment for any crime. Mercy requires faith,
the opposite of truth. To be convinced by him-which we are at the
end of the film° 2-means we no longer take for granted the existence
of any certain truth about culpability and justice. With this, the law
has ceased being a revelatory mechanism and becomes a constitutive
and historically contingent process. The film viewer learns that law
102. Of all the characters in the film, the boys' attorney is the one with which the audience
identifies most strongly. His faith and principles motivate and sustain the film's otherwise
violent storyline. In arguing so eloquently and against heavy odds for the cruelty and hypocrisy
of the death penalty, the film stands for the power of rhetoric to move law, to reshape facts and to
save lives. It also stands for the ability of the legal process to accommodate unpopular views.
Whether it also makes the Leopold-Loeb case stand for all of this is probably up to the changing
experiences of contemporary audiences. What is clear, however, is that the scandal of the
Leopold-Loeb trial-the homosexuality of the two boys, their wealth and criminal desires-is
overshadowed at the end of this film by the compassion Orson Welles' performance affects in the
audience as represented in the judge's decision to forgo the death penalty for life in prison.
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is not about the search for a definitive story, but instead that legal
truth (what counts as justice) evolves over time. Compulsion may be
a story of a specific historical event, but it teaches that all historical
accounts-even those that form the basis of legal judgment-require
narrative choice, symbolic play and faith.
V. SWOON
Unlike Compulsion, Swoon does not begin with an explicit truth
claim. There is no voice-over announcer promising a shocking or
tell-all film. Instead, Swoon makes its truth claim through its explicit
documentary features. °3 Shot in black and white and with a handheld camera, Swoon looks like a home movie or an amateur
documentary film. The handheld camera signals immediate and
unmediated footage, suggesting an eyewitness account from someone holding a film camera in the presence of Leopold and Loeb in
1924. The choice of black and white film in the year 1991 makes the
film look antique, as if from the 1920s that it references. The film's
blurry edges and low-tech monocular focus compound its aged and
authentic feeling. If the film were not clearly dated 1991 in the
credits and packaging, it would be unclear to an untrained eye that
the film was made in the last decade of the twentieth century.
Perhaps most importantly for the film's truth claims, the film
director, Tom Kalin, does not use pseudonyms for the subjects of his
film: Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb are the film's central figures
in name and character. In fact, Kalin goes as far as to have them
narrate the story as if reading from diaries. Throughout the film, we
hear recitations such as: "March 4, 1923: Dick threw a brick through
the Paulson drug store window .... May 20, 1924: Nathan bought a
chisel and nineteen feet of rope. I'm afraid he'll ruin everything."
This first person narration mimics the form of a memoir or an
autobiography, each of which have their own conventions and

103. The packaging and distribution of Swoon highlight its documentary qualities. The cover
of the 1992 New/Line Home Video version of Swoon reads:
Trapped in the dark comers of our unconscious lurks the most shocking murder of this
century: the true case of Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb, young men who horrified
the nation when they were convicted for the murder of a 13 year old boy . . ..
Acclaimed film artist Tom Kalin has fashioned a darkly fascinating richly
impressionistic film noir that transcends history to give life and voice to the figures that
history has condemned.
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traditions for representing truth.0 14 All of these formal features
participate in the conventions of documentary filmmaking and create
the illusion of authenticity.1 °5
Despite these indices of documentary filmmaking, Swoon is not
a documentary. It may be a chronicle of sorts and an attempt at an
explanation of a historic trial, but unlike most documentaries, Swoon
Swoon is not a
is difficult to both watch and understand.
straightforward representation of past events. To the contrary, its
canted shots, fragmented editing and narrative tangents make it feel
more like an experimental or avant-garde film. 6 The film opens
with a shot of a pale, cloud-swept sky, of women and men
performing a play in a field, and then of (what we learn later to be)
Nathan and Richard throwing glass bottles at cement walkways.
These opening shots are from disparate angles; none are sutured
together along anticipated sight-lines. The voices are stilted. The
actors seem self-conscious of their performance. And the fast-paced
scene of vandalism that introduces the film audience to Nathan and
Richard is left unexplained. It neither sets the tone for the pace of
the film that follows, nor serves as a kernel for the film's plot. The
opening is punctuated by a clandestine ceremony where, in a dimly
lit abandoned barn, the two young men exchange commitment rings.
As a beginning, it is enigmatic and slightly frustrating. Although one
might think that the film is anticipating questions that it will later
answer, its avant-garde form forecloses that possibility. Swoon may
poach some features from the documentary genre such as the genre's
central promise of revelation and truth, but it will not fulfill that
promise. In the end, the film audience learns more about a legal
system that looks unbending and bigoted than it does about the
Leopold and Loeb duo who remain shrouded in mystery and
intrigue.0 7
104. Silbey, Criminal Performances,supra note 81.
105. NICHOLS, REPRESENTING REALITY, supra note 64, at 8-31.
106. "Shot in the hauntingly stylish manner of avant-garde advertising, the black-and-white
'Swoon' is a tricky, unpredictable synthesis of the mannered and the real." Janet Maslin, A New
Vision of Leopold and Loeb, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1992, at C8.
107. The focus on the legal system and not the characters may work analytically, but it leaves
something missing cinematically. As one film reviewer noted,
In the end, "Swoon" is more successful in taking apart this particular chapter in
criminal history than in reassembling it with a clear point of view. The film's most
unnerving aspect, aside from its utter fearlessness in tackling this subject, is the pitiless
calm with which Mr. Kalin surveys his landscape. Although "Swoon" sounds a
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Although the film narrates the premeditated murder of Bobby
Franks in excruciating detail, shifting back and forth between Nathan
and Richard in the form of first person diary entries, the story is not
without glaring gaps in time, space and narrative logic. We hear
about the boys' feelings about being Jewish, their dreams of Ancient
These personal
Egypt, and their concerns about each other.
commentaries, while intriguing, are left unconnected to the film's
obvious central narrative: the murder for which both boys will stand
trial at the film's end. For example, at one point, the film shows
Nathan listening to a foreign language tape and reciting the phrase "I
am small, my heart is pure" in French, Spanish and German. Then
we hear him listing some of Europe's more famous homosexual men:
Oscar Wilde, Prince Yulenberg, Marcel Proust, and Frederick the
Great. And then later, we hear Nathan say, "April 19, 1924: Best
time yet. Dick seemed to enjoy himself." These scattered thoughts
leave the viewer with more questions than answers. Do we feel sorry
for Nathan, who appears lonely? Do we scoff at his hubris as he
compares himself to accomplished men of the past? Do we worry
about the boys' relationship as they navigate the delicate terrain of
teenage romance and sexual intimacy? What does all of this have to
do with the murder of Bobby Franks? The film provides no clear
answers. So whereas these specific and personal details make the
film feel more "real," they also contribute to the film's confusion,
forcing the viewer to focus more on the film's form than its
narrative and on its structure rather than its contents and claims.' s
Canted shots and impressionistic uses of light (as in the beginning
with the ring exchange which we see by the glare of light through the
barn's floor planks) reinforce the film's construction and its
mediating framework, undermining and complicating the truth
claims (transparency and clarity) it pledges at the outset.
And yet, despite its obscure narrative and form, Swoon shows
Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb kill Bobby Franks. It also shows
the two boys sexually active with one another. This is in direct
resounding protest against the homophobic attitudes that influence Leopold and Loeb's
trial, and acknowledges the swift social changes that may have contributed to the
kidnapers' behavior, its true attitude toward this duo is finally elusive.
Id.
108. Ironically, these details of the boys' daily lives together, which serve to make the film so
much more believable, may be the most fictionalized part of the film. I have found no historical
accounts that verify this level of detail.
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contrast with Compulsion, which although promising an expose,
never shows the murder on screen or the boys' intimacy with one
another. Swoon is thus much more explicit and voyeuristic than
Compulsion, despite it being much less straightforward in style or
narrative structure. Like oglers at the periphery of an accident site,
the film viewer stares at the film screen as it shows the murder of
Bobby Franks, the bloody murder weapon, the disposal of the body,
and the cover-up.
The transparency of vision does not necessarily translate to
clarity of understanding, however. Indeed, it is unclear what this
close look at a clandestine relationship between Nathan and Richard
tells us. Swoon devotes so much of its story to the establishment and
justification of the loving and dependent relationship between the
two boys, that the story about the murder feels secondary to the story
of their intimacy. Indeed, the murder of Bobby Franks is not the
focal point of the film. Instead it feels like a culmination-perhaps
even a consummation--of the boys' love." 9 Unlike Compulsion,
most of Swoon's film time is devoted to the planning and
commission of the murder, the intensity of which bind the two boys
in friendship and commitment. Whereas Compulsion concerned the
propriety of the law's judgment of the boys' act without a back story
to illuminate the boys' motives and mindset, Swoon's premise and
fulfillment is in the details of the bargained for relationship between
Nathan and Richard.
By focusing on the boys' relationship instead of the murder,
Swoon questions the dominant story told about Leopold and Loeb
(that they were cold-blooded murderers and thrill-seekers). The film
replaces the question of the boys' criminality with an investigation
into their intimate and devoted relationship. As a story about
homoerotic love instead of the more infamous Franks' murder,
Swoon makes the film viewer aware of the possibility that there are
multiple persuasive accounts about the same event in history. Thus,
when the film's narrating voice changes near the end of the film from
the intimate first person of Leopold and Loeb to more distant third
person in the role of legal arbiter, the film viewer has been trained to
accept the possibility of multiple story lines and storytellers. For
109. As Nathan says in the film, "Killing Bobby Franks together would join Richard and me
for life." Swoon, supra note 4.

Winter 2007]

TRUTH TALES A ND TRIAL FILMS

example, upon finding the murder victim, a radio newscaster
announces: "Police go undercover in an attempt to nab the
degenerate kidnapper of Bobby Franks." And on the day of the trial,
a newscaster reports: "Today [during] the case of angel face Loeb
and mastermind Leopold [ ... ] veteran defense attorney Clarence
Darrow avoids jury by admitting guilt of clients [... ]" Not until this

late in the film are Leopold and Loeb are described as "masterminds"
or "degenerates." Not until the end of the film does the law (against
murder and homosexuality) become a third character with a new
perspective on Leopold and Loeb. Until this point, the viewer knows
the two boys only through the film's portrayal of them, as angry
adolescents, as lovers, and as prodigies. And because from the
beginning the film divulged so much of their life together and their
complex personalities, the film viewer resists the ease with which the
media covering the legal trial judges Nathan and Richard. By
juxtaposing the film's complex characterization of the two boys with
the snap judgments of them by the press and the legal system, the
viewer is urged to compare the two frames of reference, and to
critique the two stories told on film and rooted in historical fact.
Given that the substantial part of the film is devoted to the boys'
intimate relationship, the experience of the film's legal judgment,
which is overwhelmingly of moral condemnation and legal guilt,
feels in large part motivated by homophobia and anti-Semitism,
sensibilities that for a 1991 audience are unpalatable and out-of-date.
Given the focus of the film on the boys' relationship and the
film's ambivalence toward law as a central ordering mechanism,
Swoon's trial scene is understandably anticlimactic. Swoon's trial
does not dwell on the facts of case or Clarence Darrow's historic
court performance. In Swoon, there is no flashy closing argument,
no direct address to the viewer. In contrast to Compulsion, in Swoon,
the boys' attorney is neither a focus nor the legal hero."' The trial is
about the vagaries of the boys' mens rea and not about current death
penalty policy. Indeed, Swoon's representation of the law is so
uncomplicated as compared to the film's complex representation of
the boys' relationship that the film reinforces the lack of
sophistication the legal system brings to an understanding of Nathan
Leopold and Richard Loeb.
110. See STAM ET AL., supra note 90; infra text accompanying note 102.
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For example, the trial scene begins with what looks like a shot
of an old photograph. The screen is sepia colored, not black, like an
aged and faded photograph. And because no one moves for several
seconds in the opening trial sequence, the viewer wonders if the film
is incorporating actual photographic stills from the 1924 trial. But
then an actor crosses the courtroom in the back, and the viewer hears
a psychoanalyst explaining the nature of the two young men's sexual
relationship. Women are told to leave the courtroom to be shielded
from the "inappropriate" discussions. And the viewer hears talk of
the boys' basic motive as being "the desire to satisfy unnatural lust."
Given the ancient feel of the film during this sequence, the
homophobia and gender bias is dismissed as outdated. And when,
through its caricatures of psychologists and criminologists, the film
ridicules the once held beliefs that "Jewish" noses, wide brows and
weak chins are markers of criminal identity, the viewer feels sure
that the film is arguing against these stereotypes and not in support of
them. Despite the gruesome details of the murder and the boys'
deviant relationship, the callous discrimination enacted in the trial
scene creates sympathy and tolerance for the boys and undermines
the viewer's faith in the legal system.
Neither the trial nor the punishment is the climax of Swoon."'
The trial and the handing down of the sentence lasts for
approximately four minutes in a film that it is over an hour and a half
long. (Recall that in Compulsion, the closing argument of the trial
itself was over fifteen minutes of the film.) Swoon's trial merely
serves as a bridge connecting the private life of Nathan and Richard
(as represented by the first person narration throughout the bulk of
the film) with their public reputation (as represented by the third
person narration surrounding their trial). The trial's focus is the
homophobia that served to explain the boys' anti-social and criminal
activities. Despite the scientific and legal rhetoric mobilized by the
defense attorney and judge to explain and condemn the boys'
behavior, these legal actors are portrayed as executioners who
pervert the role of law by conflating homosexuality with criminal
111. The trial is far from the emotional climax of the film. The film's denouement takes
place in jail and unravels quickly like an epilogue. We see James Day kill Richard in prison, hear
of Day's acquittal of the murder, and then we see Nathan mourning Richard's death. He returns
the ring we saw the two boys exchange in the beginning of the film to Richard, and then he wails
like a baby inside his cell. Richard's death leaves Nathan emotionless for the rest of the film and
Nathan's high pitched crying leaves the viewer scarred.
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deviance. Swoon's viewer is positioned by the film to feel that the
law misjudged Leopold and Loeb, not because the murder they
committed was justified, but because their intimacy with each other
(which the viewer appreciates as genuine) should have been
irrelevant to the public judgment of their crime. Without believing
that the film is factually comprehensive, Swoon's viewer comes to
understand that the legal system unjustly condemned the boys for
their homosexuality and perpetuated a cruel intolerance for
homoerotic love.
In this way and like Compulsion, Swoon portrays law not as a
machine through which facts go in and truth comes out. The only
truth to which Swoon seems to subscribe is the possibility that the
legal system's verdicts and sentences are at best incomplete and at
worst narrow-minded and discriminatory. But then, how do we
make sense of the film's documentary features, especially in light of
its avant-garde and expressive flourishes? As the first person
narration fades into the third person, the viewer is like a court
stenographer, relentlessly processing information without contesting
it or believing it. Like documentary film, Swoon is an argument." 2
It is not an argument about the guilt or innocence of the young
Leopold and Loeb because the viewer sees that they are guilty of
murder and of criminal malice. The film is nonetheless an argument
in favor of the retelling of the history of Nathan Leopold and Richard
Loeb as lovers as well as criminals. Because the trial is not the focus
of this trial film, the trial serves merely to make this point: the result
of legal proceedings may be explained by a lack of context
surrounding their crime, which is later forgotten in the wake of
rumor and scandal. Swoon advocates for the consideration of social
and cultural context when judging criminal behavior and criticizes
the legal system for shunning both. The film places the legal
judgment of Leopold and Loeb in the perspective of contemporary
history in order to denounce the legal system's expressed
homophobia as bigotry.
112. 1 have elsewhere made the point that all documentary film is argumentative and
assertive. See Silbey, Judges As Film Critics, supra note 5, at 498 & n.22, 499 & n.25 (proposing
that filmic evidence be treated as assertive proffers subject to cross-examination and critique like
other testimonial proffers, and not as illustrative evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 1001); see also
Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 6, at 168-171 (arguing that filmed
confessions made by police and detectives are like state sponsored documentaries that advocate
on behalf of the modem state).
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The film also suggests that it is wrong for a legal judgment to
define with certainty an individual's identity. Instead of answering
the questions planted at its beginning-"why did they do it" and "is
this a true story?"-the film tells a complex tale of homophobia,
anti-Semitism, fame, genius, and emerging homoerotic desire. The
historical consciousness constituted by this film-part voyeur and
part witness to law's errant categorization-is critical of legal,
filmic, and historical discourses that claim to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth.I 3
VI. CONCLUSION

Compulsion and Swoon could not be more different in form,
focus or for what each says about law and its role in society. But
what about what each says about Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb?
What is it a viewer can say he or she knows about the Leopold-Loeb
case based on the viewing of these films? Inevitably, these are the
questions a viewer should be eager to ask. But, as suggested above,
these are the wrong questions. These trial films, already selfconscious in form and content of the undeniable fictiveness of all
stories and of law's conspiratorial role in crafting them, begs us, their
audience, not to ask what we can say we know about the characters
and their history from film. Instead of answering questions and
settling disputes as to the truth of the matter (as tell-all films promise
and trials as adjudicative processes must), these trial films raise
questions about the diverse and controversial role of law in
perpetuating certain stories over others. These trial films about true
stories are not about revealing a truth-whatever that could be said
to be-but instead are about the production of truths through law as

113. The film's epilogue confirms the film's factual ambiguity and its emphasis instead on
metaphor and symbolism to make its point. At the film's conclusion, an unidentified narrator
reports that Nathan becomes an X-ray technician in prison and was freed on parole after thirtythree years. While watching what looks like a televised interview with what seems to be an aged
Nathan Leopold, the viewer is then told that Nathan moved to San Juan, Puerto Rico, married
Gertrude Feldman Garcia and had a child. We are left wondering whether this is actual footage
of an interview with Nathan Leopold spliced into an otherwise entirely staged film about the
Leopold-Loeb case. The film concludes with the announcement of Nathan Leopold's death on
August 30, 1971, in San Juan and then also with the fantastic suggestion that immediately
following his death, his eyes were successfully transplanted to a blind woman. I have been able
to confirm only that Leopold donated his body to the University of Puerto Rico for research, not
that his eyes were successfully transplanted upon his death. See, e.g., Roz Young, Op-Ed.,
Leopold, Loeb Made to Pay, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 26, 1994, at 15A.
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merely temporary resting places for trial verdicts, constellations in
the process we know to be the common law.
The truth tale's cultivated expectation of historical accuracy
through its documentary features, when combined with its selfconsciously fictive form, produces a film viewer and a legal subject
who is critical of law's promise of individual and equal justice. This
viewer is made aware of historical and cultural contingencies that
limit law's application. As time passes and stories accumulate about
the same case, the legal verdict loses its significance and status as the
"final word" on the matter at issue. The film viewer of multiple
versions of the same story accounts for the possibility that law is not
a teleological system (its goal being the uncovering of the truth each
side is fighting over) but a pragmatic process, a process which is
motivated by contemporary and often contradictory circumstances
that change over time. Although these truth tales initially cultivate a
desire for exposure and discovery based on the ideological
correlation in film and law between truth and perception, the selfconscious form of the film and the law as portrayed through each
truth tale enables the viewer to critique the desire for certainty and
truth. As viewers of truth tales, we can say we know only what the
film tells us and that the law can do no better. While we appreciate
the law's requirement for static verdicts at specific moments, truth
tales help us understand the renewed significance of legal verdicts
through time.
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